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“Bailing out” has recently become a standard ex-
pression in newspapers’ business sections all over
the world. First, there was the financial sector, fol-
lowed by the automotive industry until finally many
large and middle-sized companies longed for public
help.The survival of huge corporations or crucial fi-
nancial institutions is of great interest in a crisis that
has come close to a collapse of both the capital and
labour markets but over the long run another ques-
tion arises:Who’s going to bail out the governments?
Imagine the US not just borrowing some USD 
730 billion for the fiscal stimulus package to fight a
deep recession but borrowing this sum every year
from now on until forever.This is the amount the US
would have to pay as an annuity for its pre-crisis ex-
plicit and implicit debt if no reform of social security
and other entitlement programs like Medicare were
instituted. Other developed countries are better off
but still far from fiscal sustainability.
This study provides the outcome of a Generational
Accounting analysis for eight OECD countries,
namely Austria, France, Germany, Norway, Spain,
Switzerland, the UK and the US. Generational
Accounting is a well-recognized concept that an-
swers questions about a country’s fiscal sustainabil-
ity and its intergenerational balance or misbalance.
The methodological root goes back to Auerbach,
Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991, 1992 and 1994), who
sought to illustrate the effects of intergenerational
policy.After all, probably nearly every piece of leg-
islation affects not only living but future generations
as well.Therefore,in the last 15 years several Gene-
rational Accounting studies for 29 different coun-
tries have been added to today’s literature. Some
countries like Norway even include Generational
Accounts in their government reports.However,due
to different sets of necessary assumptions and dif-
ferent statistical measures and methodologies,these
studies are often not comparable.This is why we set-
up a comprehensive framework for our sample so
that the outcomes are comparable and can also be
interpreted in absolute and relative terms.
Methodology, data and general assumptions
Methodology
Generational Accounting is based on the intertempo-
ral budget constraint,capturing all present and future
payment and transfer flows between an individual and
the public sector,thus allowing a calculation of net tax
payments of every living and future generation over
their remaining life cycle.A Generational Account is
therefore the average net tax payment over the re-
maining life cycle of a member of one cohort.
Contrary to classic budget indicators like the explic-
it debt or budget deficits, Generational Accounting
makes it feasible to derive the implicit debt of a coun-
try’s fiscal policy through entitlement programs like
social security or social health insurance schemes.
Therefore, statements on long-term implications or,
even simpler,the sustainability of a current policy can
be confirmed quantitatively.1
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1A detailed description of the method of Generational Accounting
including a literature review and a discussion of the concept’s limi-
tations can be found in Hagist (2008).See also Raffelhüschen (1999)
and Bonin (2001).Using this concept, a fiscal policy can be called sus-
tainable if the intertemporal budget constraint holds,
i.e.,if all net tax payments of all living and future gen-
erations plus the official public (explicit) debt sum up
to zero. If this is not the case, the fiscal situation of a
country is unbalanced or in other words, unsustain-
able. The public is then confronted with a so-called
fiscal gap,the sum of the explicit and implicit debt.It
reveals the unfunded claims of a country’s population
against its public coffers.
In addition to the fiscal gap,it is possible to derive nu-
merous indicators to compare the fiscal situation
among countries or between different scenarios.2The
revenue gap,for example,states how much a country
would have to raise taxes and social security contri-
butions to close its fiscal gap. Thus, adding the rev-
enue gap to the current tax quota results in the so-
called sustainable tax quota.
So far, only two other studies (at least to our knowl-
edge) work with comparable frameworks, i.e., the
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs of the European Commission (1999) and
Hagist (2008).3 Other comparable governmental re-
ports from the EU or the OECD often use a slightly
different concept – the OECD fiscal sustainability
concept – which draws on Blanchard et al.(1990) (see
also Benz and Fetzer (2006)).
Data and general assumptions
To compute the stated indicators for our cross-coun-
try-analysis, we require a projection of each popula-
tion,the expenditures and revenues of the public sec-
tor as stated in their national accounts in a base year,
age and sex-specific microprofiles for the different ex-
penditure and revenue types,and a growth rate as well
as a discount rate.Due to the delay of internationally
comparable statistics,we have chosen the year 2004 as
our base year. Therefore all numbers and values are
in present value terms for the year 2004, if not stated
otherwise. Population projections are calculated with
a demographic program developed by Bonin (2001).
For all European countries, basic demographic data,
such as the base year’s population,age-specific fertil-
ity rates and mortality tables as well as information
about migration, are taken from Eurostat or for the
US from the Census Bureau. Budget data stem from
OECD (2008a) and are divided into several subcate-
gories like pension payments,social health insurance,
etc.,via several other statistics (OECD 2008b;OECD
2007a; OECD 2007b; OECD 2007d; OECD 2007e
and OECD 2007f).4 Age and sex-specific micropro-
files are from various sources described in Hagist
(2008) for Austria,France,Germany,Switzerland,the
UK and the US; in Fichtner and Hagist (2008) for
Norway; and in Gronert-Alvarez (2008) for Spain.
All Generational Accounting results are sensitive to
growth and discount rate assumptions.For an infinite
time horizon,any future projection of these parame-
ters remains arbitrary.This is especially true in an in-
ternational comparison because in such an analysis
one not only accounts for the fluctuation over time
but for the variation of these parameters between the
countries. However, as Fetzer (2006) has shown, in
such an analysis as ours the quantitative level of the
results is only affected by the difference between the
real growth and the real interest rate and not by their
absolute levels.So we employ a growth rate of 1.5 per-
cent p. a. and a discount rate of 3 percent p.a. (i.e., a
difference of 1.5 percentage points).This seems to be
a reasonable compromise considering the compara-
bility of our results between the countries and the ob-
servations of these parameters in the past. The real
growth rates of the countries analyzed have been be-
tween 0.9 (Switzerland) and 2 percent (US) p.a.with-
in the last three decades. A reasonable range of in-
terest rate assumptions is determined by the fact that
public receipts and expenditures are significantly
more uncertain than non-risky long-term government
bonds on the one hand, but not as volatile as the re-
turn on risky assets on the other hand. Accordingly,
the discount rate chosen should range between the
average rates of return on these types of assets. In
light of this argument, we have opted for a standard
discount rate of 3 percent p.a.
The fiscal and demographic status quo
Fiscal situation in the short run
Table 1 reports the fiscal status quo of our cross-coun-
try sample.As is evident every country, with the no-
table exception of Norway,had a budget deficit in our
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2 Benz and Fetzer (2006) discuss the pros and cons of several indi-
cators.
3 There are, however, numerous studies by different international
bodies using other methodologies.
4 For a more detailed description of the data sets used, see Hagist,
Moog and Raffelhüschen (2009). Norway’s oil wealth and its
Government Pension Fund were modelled after petroleum projec-
tions by OECD (2007c).CESifo DICE Report 4/2009 31
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base year 2004 ranging from 0.4 percent of GDP
(Spain) to 4.2 percent (the US).Due to its oil wealth
and the assigned revenues,Norway had a budget sur-
plus of 11.1 percent of GDP. In terms of the
Maastricht criteria our sample can be divided into
two groups. One group (Austria, Norway, Spain and
Switzerland) easily fulfilled the Maastricht criterion
of a budget deficit below three percent of GDP, the
other four (France, Germany, the UK and the US) –
which are also the biggest economies in our sample –
did not clear this hurdle. The same conclusion basi-
cally holds regarding the primary deficits,with the big
four having significant structural deficits.With respect
to the public debt in 2004, the picture is slightly dif-
ferent, with the UK at the lowest level and Austria
and Germany at the highest.
The structure of the revenues and expenditures of
every country in 2004 can be found in Table 2.
France had the largest government
share of economic activity with 
53 percent of GDP followed by
Austria and Germany.The US and
Switzerland had the lowest values
with 36 percent. Social security
programs, such as pensions and
means-tested benefits, are the
main reasons for these differences
in expenditures. While Austria,
France and Germany contribute
40 percent of their public budgets to these categories
(around 20 percent of GDP), for the US this ratio
amounts only to 20 percent (or seven percent of GDP).
Also,health expenditures vary between the countries.
It should be noted,however,that measuring health ex-
penditures is difficult in a COFOG (classification of
the functions of the government) scheme,which is why
our numbers are slightly different to the ones report-
ed in OECD (2007e) or Hagist (2008).One reason,for
example, is that while for the latter two studies long-
term care expenditures in Germany are a health-re-
lated expenditure category,they are included in the so-
cial security expenditures in our COFOG budget.This
also holds for Switzerland where the biggest share of
health expenditures is paid by private insurance com-
panies operating in a state-controlled market,which is
why Hagist (2008) includes them in his analysis.
Interestingly total education expenditures differ con-
siderably between the analyzed countries. However,
this is not correlated with the total
fertility rate and must be seen as a
political decision. Although Ger-
many and Spain have the lowest
shares of expenditures on educa-
tion and also very low fertility rates
(about 1.4 children per fertile wom-
an), Switzerland and Austria have
comparable levels of fertility but
spend more on education.
On the revenue side, it is possible
to distinguish between the differ-
ent priorities of the countries’ fis-
cal policy. While social security
contributions play a minor role in
countries like the US,the UK,Nor-
way and Switzerland, they have
nearly the same level of revenue as
direct and indirect taxes in Austria,
France and Germany.Direct taxes
are relatively the lowest in Ger-
many, while Switzerland and the
Table 1 
Budget and primary deficit and public debt in 2004, in % of GDP
ESP CH AUT NOR GER  FR US UK
Budget deficit 0.4 1.1 1.3  –11.1 3.8 3.6 4.2 3.4 
Primary deficit –1.6  –0.5  –1.7  –12.5  1.0  0.8  1.7  1.4 
Public debt 45.4 55.3 62.8  40.6 62.5 60.4 57.1 37.2
Sources: OECD (2008a,b); Eurostat; own calculations.
Table 2  
Public expenses and revenues in 2004, in % of GDP
ESP CH AUT NOR GER  FR US UK
Expenses 38.9 35.9 51.0 45.4 47.1 53.2 36.2 43.3
Social security 13.0 12.7  21.3  17.7  22.1 22.1  7.0  15.8
Health 5.5  4.1 7.1 7.7 6.1  7.3  7.4 6.8 
Education 4.4  5.8 6.0 6.2 4.2  6.2  6.3 5.7 
General public
services
4.8  4.4 7.1 4.3 6.1  7.3  4.6 4.5 
 Interest  pay-
ments
2.0  1.6 3.0 1.4 2.8  2.8  2.6 2.0 
Miscellaneous 2.7  2.8 4.2 2.9 3.2  4.5  2.1 2.6 
Other expenses 11.1 9.0  9.5  9.5  8.6  10.3  10.9  10.5
Revenues 38.5  34.8 49.6 56.6 43.3 49.6  32.0 40.0
Taxes 22.1  21.6 28.3 33.8 21.8 26.4  18.9 28.4
Direct taxes 10.2  14.4 13.6 21.0 10.0 11.1  11.5 15.4
Indirect taxes 11.9 7.2 14.7 12.8 11.8 15.3 7.4 13.0
Social security
contributions
13.0 7.0 16.3  9.4 18.0 18.0 7.1  8.2 
Other revenues 3.5 6.3  5.0 13.3  3.6 5.1 5.9  3.3 
Sources: OECD (2007a, 2008); Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung (2008); own
calculations. US place the lowest indirect tax burdens on their cit-
izens. The UK has the highest share of direct taxes,
however the overall burden on tax (and contribution)
payers is relatively lower. Norway is again an excep-
tion when it comes to tax revenues due to its natural
resources. The returns on licensing and the public-
owned petroleum companies are responsible for the
large share of miscellaneous revenues in our Table.
Demography in the status quo
The determinants of the demographic development
of a country are basically the mortality rate, the fer-
tility rate and the net migration.Table 3 shows the de-
velopment and the expectations of the total fertility
rate in our eight countries.The fertility rate is proba-
bly the most debated of the three determinants, es-
pecially in Continental Europe. In the sample under
evaluation, all countries had fertility rates greater
than or equal to 2.0 at the beginning of the 1970s.The
replacement fertility rate for the entire population is
approximately 2.1. In all analyzed countries the fer-
tility rate decreased progressively until stabilization
occurred in the mid-1980s.However,this stabilization
took place at very different levels. While the US,
France and the UK recovered on a relatively high lev-
el of over 1.8 children per fertile woman the German-
speaking community of Austria, Germany and Swit-
zerland stabilized at approximately “only”1.4 children
per fertile woman.
Regarding mortality,there is a clear trend across all an-
alyzed countries that longevity for both sexes is rising.
However, the pace of this trend is quite different for
each country.While female Americans ranked third in
our sample in 1970, they have the lowest life expec-
tancy in 2003 and also the lowest expectation for 2060
by more than two years. Furthermore the differences
between the sexes and their development vary among
the countries. For example, while the relatively large
difference of 7.5 years in France in 1970 between men
and women dropped to only 7.0 over 33 years, it fell
from 6.2 years in 1970 to 5.1 years in Switzerland even
while French longevity as a whole grew faster. In our
sample Switzerland and France have, however, the
highest life expectancy for 2060 – 90 years for females
and over 85 years for males, respectively.
The third parameter which is crucial for population
development – net migration – can be influenced by
political decisions.While all countries in our sample
are net “importers” of people, there are differences
not only due to factors like labour markets or income
but also policy-induced ones.Citizens of all EU mem-
ber countries can settle in the UK, for example. In
contrast Austria, France and Germany have restrict-
ed the movement of citizens from the new Eastern
European member states (which they are allowed to
do until 2011).As indicated in Table 3,Spain followed
by Switzerland and Norway are the most open
economies with respect to migration in the base year,
followed by Austria and the US. However, Spain’s
high net migration is expected to decline quite sig-
nificantly over the next five decades.
Demographic development and fiscal sustainability
Given the current demographic situation and the ex-
pectations of Eurostat and the Census Bureau about
the development of the crucial demographic para-
meters,we project each population for the eight coun-




Year ESP CH AUT NOR  GER FR US UK
2004  1.4 1.4 1.4 1.9 1.3 2.0 2.0 1.8  Fertility rate
2060  1.6 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.5 1.9 2.0 1.8 
2004  1.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3  Net migration
(% of total population) 2060  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 
Life expectancy 
2004  77.1 78.7 77.5 78.4 76.1 77.0 75.3 77.0  men
2060  84.5 85.8 84.9 85.2 84.9 85.1 81.5 85.0
2004  83.8 83.9 83.1 82.2 81.7 84.0 80.5 81.4  women
2060  89.6 89.9 89.2 89.2 89.1 90.1 85.5 88.9
Sources: Eurostat; Census Bureau; National Statistical Offices.CESifo DICE Report 4/2009 33
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tries.While for the fiscal analysis the ageing of soci-
eties is the most important point,we present our pro-
jections in the form of the old-age-dependency-ratio,
the relation between probable pensioners to the po-
tential work force. Figure 1 illustrates our results.
As the Figure indicates,in 2004 Germany was the old-
est economy of our sample.There were nearly 32peo-
ple over 65 years of age per 100 people aged 20 to 
65 years.This ratio will rise until 2060 to around 67.
The only “older” country in this regard will be Spain
with a ratio of 71 “old-timers” to 100 in the working
generations.The Figure shows that the countries with
the current and expected low fertility levels will also
be the old ones in the future, while the US with the
highest birth rate and also a very high net migration
will be the youngest. However, for fiscal purposes 
not the absolute levels of the old-age-dependency ra-
tio but rather the relative development is of most in-
terest.Here all countries are quite
similar with a doubling of its old-
age-dependency ratio.
Another factor that is often over-
looked is the youth-dependency-
ratio.As we have seen above,not
only fertility rates but also edu-
cation expenditures, the biggest
block of public expenditure for
adolescents, are quite different
over our sample.While some coun-
tries are only faced with “expen-
sive” pensioners, others also face
the challenge of financing the
very young at the same time. For
example, in a fiscal sense, Ger-
many is in a comfortable situation
given its very low level of fertili-
ty and its low level of education
expenditure per head while the
US is facing the exact opposite
with a high level of education ex-
penditure and a fertility near the
replacement rate.
Given the demographic projec-
tions and the aligned data sets, it
is possible to derive the two sus-
tainability indicators, the fiscal
and revenue gap. Figure 2 shows
the fiscal gaps for the analyzed
countries.
Here the ranking for the fiscal gap, i.e., the sum of
explicit and implicit debt,is quite different from the
one based on the official public debt quotas.While
in the first ranking the differences between the
countries are quite small, we have major differ-
ences given the ranking based on the fiscal gap. In
total, Spain heads the ranking with a rather small
fiscal gap of 0.8 times its 2004 GDP.Despite Spain’s
quite low share of expenditures devoted to social
security and health this result seems surprising giv-
en the projected rise in Spain’s old-age dependen-
cy ratio. One explanation for this could be the cur-
rent low levels of pension benefits for Spanish
women. As we have based our projection on to-
day’s structure of pension benefits, our results
could be misleading considering that the labour
participation of Spanish women has changed dra-
matically since the end of the Franco regime.
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Figure 2jor public pension reform and a special accounting of
its health care system,5 Switzerland faces inter-
temporal liabilities of “only” 65 percent its GDP.
Adding the official public debt, the fiscal gap
amounts to 120 percent.6
The UK is at the very bottom of our sustainability
ranking with a total gap of nearly 550 percent of its
GDP. This is at a first glance surprising considering
that the British deficit is smaller than those of France
and Germany. The British primary deficit, however,
was quite large compared to the latter two countries.
Maybe even more astonishing might be the implicit
gap of the US. Despite the growing population and
comparably low social expenditures,the future liabil-
ities of the US public add up to 3.5 GDPs.7 However,
as already said before,education expenditure is quite
high and there is one major difference when it comes
to social expenditures – the public health care sector.
While all of the seven other countries have a more or
less universal health coverage,the US covers publicly
only the poor and the elderly (and public employees).
So relatively spoken its public health system is very
expensive given expenditure per insured individual
compared with other countries.A third reason is that
the US has not carried out – again in comparison to
most of Continental Europe – a major overhaul of its
social security programs.
With a significant difference of close to one GDP,
France,Germany,Norway and Austria follow the US.
Given the budget data and the demographic projec-
tions, it is another unexpected
outcome. It seems that the mar-
ket-friendly Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries are clearly living their cur-
rent public lives on credit while
Continental Europe has at least
achieved some fiscal responsibili-
ty with the latest reforms of its
welfare states.
Norway cannot be seen as part of
Continental Europe, not only ge-
ographically but also in terms of this analysis. If
Norway had no oil, it would look like the US or the
UK in fiscal terms, given that the Government
Pension Fund and future oil revenues are worth over
275 percent of GDP. But to be fair, Norway has tak-
en action this year against this development with a
major overhaul of its pension system, which has not
been taken into account in this study.8
There are some caveats in this analysis, however, es-
pecially if you compare the countries, which is our
stated goal. For an international comparison the fis-
cal gap might not be appropriate for several reasons.
The biggest flaw may be that the eight countries have
a quite different demographic outlook,which will de-
termine their future economic power and as a result
their ability to pay their debts.With a growing popu-
lation, the economic power of the US will increase
and so will its GDP (and thus its tax base) while the
German population will not only shrink in size also
its workforce will decline,which co-determines GDP.
An appropriate indicator for an international com-
parison should take these facts into account.
This is why we also report the so-called revenue gap
and the resulting sustainable tax quota in Table 4.9As
is evident, the ranking itself stays almost the same,
with only France and Norway changing ranks.
However, it is clear that the demographic develop-
ment cannot only be reduced to ageing but must al-
so include the growth and dynamics of a population.
France has the same fiscal gap as Germany but must
adjust its total tax revenues by “only” nine percent
while in Germany the required rise in revenues
amounts to 14.6 percent. The UK still requires the
biggest increase but relatively the revenue gaps are
much closer among the countries than the fiscal gaps.
CESifo DICE Report 4/2009 34
Research Reports
5The difference of this number to Hagist (2008) could be explained
by the accounting of the Swiss health insurance system.While Hagist
(2008) considers the mandatory system as part of the Swiss fiscal
policy, this study – directed by the budget data of the OECD – on-
ly reflects public health via investments in public hospitals and sub-
sidies of health insurance premiums.
6The difference between the Swiss fiscal gaps reported here and in
Hagist et al.(2009) are due to different assumptions on the indexa-
tion of pension entitlements.
7 Hagist et al. (2009) even report an implicit debt for the US that is
significantly higher.However,this study does not reflect the increase
in the official retirement age and price (not wage) indexation of so-
cial security benefits.
Table 4 
Revenue gaps and sustainable tax quotas, in %




3.0 5.3 7.0  10.2  14.6 9.0  13.2  19.2
Sustainable tax
quota 42.2 30.3 56.3 64.0 55.7 57.3 41.9 55.2
 Source: Own calculations. 
8 For a detailed description and intertemporal analysis of the
Norwegian pension reform, see Grasdal et al. (2009).
9 The revenue gap can also be interpreted as the necessary en-
hancement of taxes to close the fiscal gap.CESifo DICE Report 4/2009 35
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In addition, countries like Switzerland, the UK and
the US have more room to manoeuvre with current
tax quotas below 40 percent while Germany, Austria
and France are already near or above the 50 percent
benchmark. Caution is thus necessary in interpreting
our results.
Conclusion and outlook
During the next few decades the populations of most
developed countries will grow older as a result of the
low level of birth rates since the 1970s and/or the con-
tinuously increasing life expectancy. Generational
Accounting which was introduced in the early nine-
ties,can illustrate the effects of this ageing process on
a country’s fiscal situation.
We quantify for Austria, France, Germany, Norway,
Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the US how unsus-
tainable their public finances are due to the demo-
graphic development.A ranking is hard to define as
we know that our analysis is far from perfect given
the rather static framework.However,if the authors
had to choose to live in a country based solely on our
findings,the choice would be sunny Spain.However,
this choice is not completely compelling.Facing a dy-
namic ageing process, it is far from clear if Spain
could repeat the growth of the last decades without
an enlargement of benefits in its social systems. In
addition,we only have rather minimal information as
to whether the current public pension structure will
prevail, i.e., if in the future Spanish women will only
receive pension benefits near the socially accepted
minimum. Perhaps a more persuasive choice would
be Switzerland – even if it only ranks second with re-
gard to the fiscal gap.Overall the Swiss are better off
than all other countries (except Spain) in our sample
by quite a margin.Furthermore,the transfer and tax
quotas are quite low, especially as seen from a
European perspective,so there is still some room for
manoeuvre.Additionally,the Swiss have proven that
they are also able to fix long-term problems in the
area of social security with their public pension re-
form. The third “best” country in our ranking,
Austria, is not as impressive as Switzerland.With its
high tax and transfer quotas,Austrians face lower in-
tertemporal liabilities as,say,their German counter-
parts but their room to act without cutting transfers
in a significant way is already very slim. For the rest
of the sample a ranking is even more difficult. One
could choose nations that already have high govern-
ment involvement (and ergo high tax and transfer
quotas) like Germany and France. These will be
strongly affected by the demographic development
though not as strongly as the UK and the US, which
still have low tax and transfer quotas but a higher
pressure on them.
The next research steps are two-fold: On the one
hand more countries should be included in our analy-
sis and the reform measures should be considered in
a more detailed way (i.e.,we had,for example,insuf-
ficient information on the French pension reforms).
On the other hand better sustainability indicators
could be derived from Generational Accounts using
a macro-modelling approach rather than from a par-
tial equilibrium analysis.
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